Analyzing debunking arguments in moral psychology: Beyond the counterfactual analysis of influence by irrelevant factors

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (e151):15-17 (2019)
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Abstract

May assumes that if moral beliefs are counterfactually dependent on irrelevant factors, then those moral beliefs are based on defective belief-forming processes. This assumption is false. Whether influence by irrelevant factors is debunking depends on the mechanisms through which this influence occurs. This raises the empirical bar for debunkers and helps May avoid an objection to his Debunker’s Dilemma.

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Joanna Demaree-Cotton
Oxford University

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