Ni convencionalismo ni naturalismo. La justificación epistemológica de la verdad en Donald Davidson

Discusiones Filosóficas 37 (21):37-55 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue for the following hypotheses: The Davidsonian language thesis, which presupposes a set of beliefs and shared desires, is a quasi-rational phenomenon that weights the truths, and from them, is able to derive other objective thoughts in the domain of values. This view of Davidson conceives that thinking and language are prior to convention, and that necessarily implies the acknowledgement of humans as thinking beings; capable of understanding even when deprived of content, this is to say, negating naturalism or substance in beliefs and innate desires.

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