Climate Models and the Irrelevance of Chaos

Philosophy of Science 88 (5):997-1007 (2021)
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Abstract

Philosophy of science has witnessed substantial recent debate over the existence of a structural analogue of chaos, which is alleged to spell trouble for certain uses of climate models. The debate over the analogy can and should be separated from its alleged epistemic implications: chaos-like behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for small dynamical misrepresentations to generate erroneous results. The kind of sensitivity that matters in epistemology is one that induces unsafe beliefs, and the existence of a structural analogue to chaos is better seen as an explanation for known safety failures than as providing evidence for unknown ones.

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Corey Dethier
University of Minnesota

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