An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147 (2016)
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Abstract

White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument is that the best explanation of the value of promoting rationality is an explanation that entails uniqueness.

Author Profiles

Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin
Sophie Horowitz
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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