Rational Credence Through Reasoning

Philosophers' Imprint 18 (2018)
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Abstract

Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.

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Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin

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