The Liar Paradox - A Case of Mistaken Truth Attribution

Axiomathes 33 (1):1-11 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A semantic solution to the liar paradox (“This statement is not true”) is presented in this article. Since the liar paradox seems to evince a contradiction, the principle of non-contradiction is preliminarily discussed, in order to determine whether dismissing this principle may be reason enough to stop considering the liar paradox a problem. No conclusive outcome with respect to the value of this principle is aspired to here, so that the inquiry is not concluded at this point and the option to explore an alternative, semantic, solution remains open. This proposed solution is focused on what the liar paradox expresses and what it fails to express.

Author's Profile

Jasper Doomen
Open University of the Netherlands

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-02

Downloads
183 (#70,707)

6 months
119 (#28,201)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?