The Mere Substitution Defence of Nudging Works for Neurointerventions Too

Journal of Applied Philosophy 10 (3):407-420 (2022)
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Abstract
Nudges are often defended on the basis that they merely substitute existing influences on choice with other influences that are similar in kind; they introduce no new kind of influence into the choice situation. I motivate the view that, if this defence succeeds in establishing the moral innocuousness of typical nudges, it also establishes the moral innocuousness of an intuitively wrongful neurochemical intervention. I then consider two attempts to rebut this view and argue that both fail. I end by spelling out four stances that the proponent of the defence might adopt in response to my argument.
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2022
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DOUTMS-3
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First archival date: 2021-11-08
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