Evidence against pragmatic encroachment

Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3135-3143 (2015)
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Abstract

We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that p only if one’s epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the consequence we find problematic is not, in fact, problematic.

Author Profiles

Timothy Pickavance
Biola University
Daniel Eaton
University of Texas at Austin

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