Abstract

Bostrom's Simulation Argument has become synonymous with simulation theory, despite the existence of alternative frameworks that also suggest our universe may be a computer simulation—frameworks that do not require the assumption of posthumans. Further, Bostrom's work has spurred discussions around the potential destruction or termination of our universe, prompting existential anxieties and fueling extensive philosophical speculation. We evaluate the arguments of Greene, Turchin, Batin, Denkenberger, and Yampolskiy, alongside the counterarguments of Braddon-Mitchell, Latham, and Edge. We conclude that Bostrom's Simulation Argument has been philosophically extended far beyond its original scope. As a contrasting model, we present Campbell's consciousness-based My Big TOE (MBT) Theory. MBT requires fewer assumptions, excludes posthuman entities, reduces the likelihood of simulation termination to near zero, includes a clear cosmogony and telos, and frames existence as an information-entropy-reduction system designed to evolve the consciousnesses of its participants—rather than the existential risk research project framework implicitly assumed in Bostrom's model.