Introducing a non-physicalist conception of panpsychism

Dissertation, University of Reading (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The aim of this [MA] dissertation is to provide an elementary example of a panpsychic universe. It is one in which – in contrast to physicalism – the experiential (defined in terms of the possession of a qualitative, subjective, structured percept) is the foundation of existence. In this panpsychism, physics is secondary because it is arrived at by collating the experiences of a collection of experiential entities as they perceive one another.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-06

Downloads
211 (#63,456)

6 months
34 (#85,973)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?