Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Type-identity theorists interpret physicalism as the claim that every property is identical to a physical property. Token-identity theorists interpret it as the claim that every particular is identical to a physical particular. The end of this paper is to undermine the distinction between the two. Drawing on recent work on generalized identities and truth-maker semantics, I demonstrate that these formulations of physicalism are logically equivalent. I then argue that each formulation has the resources to resolve problems that the other encounters.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-10-22
Latest version: 4 (2019-09-29)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Physical Realization.Shoemaker, Sydney

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
51 ( #35,784 of 43,836 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #28,853 of 43,836 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.