The power of humility in sceptical religion: why Ietsism is preferable to J. L. Schellenberg's Ultimism
Religious Studies 53 (1):97-116 (2017)
Abstract
J. L. Schellenberg’s Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism’ – the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality – to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism – the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously – is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism.
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2017
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2015-10-23
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1,059 ( #3,506 of 56,905 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
268 ( #1,533 of 56,905 )
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