The power of humility in sceptical religion: why Ietsism is preferable to J. L. Schellenberg's Ultimism

Religious Studies 53 (1):97-116 (2017)
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Abstract
J. L. Schellenberg’s Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism’ – the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality – to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism – the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously – is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism.
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2017
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ELLTPO-17
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First archival date: 2015-10-25
Latest version: 4 (2016-12-29)
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Schellenberg on Propositional Faith.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2013 - Religious Studies (2):181-194.
Religion After Atheism.Penelhum, Terence

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2015-10-23

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