Aesthetic Properties, Mind-Independence, and Companions in Guilt

In Richard Rowland & Christopher Cowie (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge (2019)
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Abstract

I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.

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Daan Evers
University of Groningen

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