Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that relativists about evaluative language face some of the same objections as non-naturalists in ethics. If these objections are powerful, there is reason to doubt the existence of relative evaluative states of affairs. In they do not exist, then relativism leads to an error theory. This is unattractive, as the position was specifically designed to preserve the truth of many evaluative claims.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2014-09-08
Latest version: 4 (2020-04-01)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
842 ( #4,927 of 57,118 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
99 ( #6,005 of 57,118 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.