Is Epistemic Safety Threatened by Frankfurt Cases? A Reply to Kelp

Diametros 17 (66):66-71 (2020)
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Abstract
I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa and Pritchard, among others, and can be formulated as follows: If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that the safety condition, expressed in, is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt-type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp’s counterexamples are ineffective against.
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Archival date: 2020-05-15
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