Responsibility Regardless of Causation

In Bacchini, Dell'Utri & Caputo (eds.), New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press (2014)
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Abstract

This paper deals with the relationship between legal responsibility and causation. I argue that legal responsibility is not necessarily rooted in causation. The general claim I aim to disprove is that responsibility is descriptive because it is fundamentally rooted in causality, and causality is metaphysically real and founded. My strategy is twofold. First, I show (in §1) that there are significant and independent non- causal form of responsibility that cannot be reduced to causal responsibility; second, in §2, I show that the very notion of causality is— lato sensu—not plainly descriptive. I will suggest that even causation is tied to evaluative elements, contrary to what is assumed by many theorists and practitioners working in normative domains.

Author's Profile

Federico L. G. Faroldi
Universita' degli Studi di Pavia

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