What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?

Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the mental states. In Section 3, I explore the correctness of normative practical reasoning. I conclude with the sceptical view that correct practical reasoning cannot require us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do.

Author's Profile

Julian Fink
Universität Bayreuth

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-12-11

Downloads
625 (#22,819)

6 months
90 (#40,375)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?