Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons

Utilitas 24 (3):381-398 (2012)
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Abstract

The difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons requires that there be a shift in the moral weight that we accord to changes in utility when we move from making intrapersonal tradeoffs to making interpersonal tradeoffs. We examine which forms of egalitarianism can, and which cannot, account for this shift. We argue that a form of egalitarianism which is concerned only with the extent of outcome inequality cannot account for this shift. We also argue that a view which is concerned with both outcome inequality and with the unfairness of inequality in individualsā€˜ expected utilities can account for this shift. Finally, we limn an alternative view, on..

Author Profiles

Alex Voorhoeve
London School of Economics
Marc Fleurbaey
Princeton University

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