Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism

In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for The Philosophy of Evidence (2024)
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Abstract

According to the ‘Evidential Internalists’, one’s evidence supervenes on one’s non-factive mental states. ‘Evidential Externalists’ deny that, and allow for external factors to determine what evidence one has. After clarifying what Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism entail, and what they are silent on, this chapter provides an opinionated overview of the main arguments and motivations behind Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism. It concludes that Evidential Externalism is a more promising view.

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Giada Fratantonio
University of Glasgow

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