Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139 (2018)
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Abstract

Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and thereby a rejection of the equality of persons, which we argue grounds the standing to blame others.

Author Profiles

Kyle G. Fritz
University of Mississippi
Daniel J. Miller
West Virginia University

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