Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you've lost track of the time. I provide a principle of chance deference which handles these problem cases. This principle has a surprising consequence for Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty Puzzle.

Author's Profile

J. Dmitri Gallow
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (PhD)

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