Love and Justice: a Paradox?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):739-759 (2017)
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Abstract
Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.
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Archival date: 2017-04-27
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References found in this work BETA
What is the Point of Equality?Anderson, Elizabeth S.
What is Egalitrianism?Scheffler, Samuel
Love as a Moral Emotion.Velleman, J. David
Needs, Values, Truth.Wiggins, David

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