Máquinas sin engranajes y cuerpos sin mentes. ¿cuán dualista es el funcionalismo de máquina de Turing?

Revista de Filosofía 67:183-200 (2011)
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Abstract

En este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo de Máquina de Turing resulta compatible con una forma de dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica o fuerte del materialismo que la inspiró originalmente en el siglo XIX. Para sostener esta tesis, argumento que efectivamente existe una notable cercanía entre el pensamiento cartesiano y dicho funcionalismo, ya que el primero afirma que es concebible/posible separar mente y cuerpo, mientras que el segundo sostiene que no es estrictamente necesario que los estados mentales se realicen en las propiedades físicas de engranajes y máquinas reales. This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence between Descartes' philosophy and this version of Functionalism, since the former holds that it is conceivable/possible to separate mind and body, while the latter holds that it is not strictly necessary that mental states are realized by the physical properties of real cogs and machines.

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