L'essenzialismo scientifico e il mentale

Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):201-226 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The major objection for including mental properties, and laws, within the domain of scientific essentialism concerns phenomenal properties, and such an objection is often raised via the intuition that zombies are conceivable. However, if these properties can be individuated in terms of roles and establish nomological relations, zombies are not possible because they would be nomologically identical to us but property different, an independence that essentialism denies. If there are not nomological relations, the essentialist denies that there are phenomenal properties, and we are zombie. But it seems there are phenomenal properties, so this option too should be discarded. The only option left is that phenomenal properties are categorical properties. However, I argue that this option is not viable and that these properties are better construed as dispositions, which gives physicalism a better chance to be defensible.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GOZLSE
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-09-10
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-12-13

Total views
153 ( #16,588 of 38,032 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #19,597 of 38,032 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.