L'essenzialismo scientifico e il mentale

Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):201-226 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The major objection for including mental properties, and laws, within the domain of scientific essentialism concerns phenomenal properties, and such an objection is often raised via the intuition that zombies are conceivable. However, if these properties can be individuated in terms of roles and establish nomological relations, zombies are not possible because they would be nomologically identical to us but property different, an independence that essentialism denies. If there are not nomological relations, the essentialist denies that there are phenomenal properties, and we are zombie. But it seems there are phenomenal properties, so this option too should be discarded. The only option left is that phenomenal properties are categorical properties. However, I argue that this option is not viable and that these properties are better construed as dispositions, which gives physicalism a better chance to be defensible.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-09-10
View other versions
Added to PP

321 (#25,277)

6 months
19 (#43,061)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?