Due osservazioni sulla metafisica della prescienza

Lebenswelt 3 (1):47-57 (2013)
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The paper discusses two problems concerning the metaphysics of foreknowledge. In the first section I focus on an argument that purports to show that there is no such a thing. In the second one I discuss the relation between the foreknowledge of our own behaviour and what we may call "the phenomenology of freedom". As for the first issue, I employ David Lewis’ discussion of the Grandfather Paradox to argue that the argument in question overlooks a key feature of the semantics of "can". As for the second issue, I develop some remarks by Paul Horwich to show that, contrary appearances notwithstanding, the foreknowledge of our own behaviour is not necessarily incompatible with the phenomenology of freedom.
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