Consequentialism and Virtue

In Christoph Halbig & Felix Timmermann (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue and Virtue Ethics (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
We examine the following consequentialist view of virtue: a trait is a virtue if and only if it has good consequences in some relevant way. We highlight some motivations for this basic account, and offer twelve choice points for filling it out. Next, we explicate Julia Driver’s consequentialist view of virtue in reference to these choice points, and we canvass its merits and demerits. Subsequently, we consider three suggestions that aim to increase the plausibility of her position, and critically analyze them. We conclude that one of those proposed revisions would improve her account.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HARCAV-3
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-09-01
Latest version: 3 (2019-09-03)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-09-01

Total views
270 ( #14,927 of 46,229 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
270 ( #1,475 of 46,229 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.