Blameworthiness, Control, and Consciousness Or A Consciousness Requirement and an Argument For It

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):389-419 (2022)
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Abstract

I first clarify the idea that blameworthiness requires consciousness as the view that one can be blameworthy only for what is a response to a reason of which one is conscious. Next I develop the following argument: blameworthiness requires exercising control in a way distinctive of persons and doing this, in view of what it is to be a person, requires responding to a reason of which one is conscious. Then I defend this argument from an objection inspired by Arpaly and Schroeder according to which responding to moral reasons suffices for exercising control distinctive of persons.

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Michael David Hatcher
FLAME University

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