Being Reasonable

Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):187-195 (2012)
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Abstract

Although feminists have spilled a great deal of ink criticizing Enlightenment conceptions of rationality, the time has come to consider constructing a positive account. Recent attempts to construct an account of rationality as a virtue concept reflect many feminist complaints concerning Enlightenment rationality, and, thus, I maintain that feminism should take seriously such a conception. Virtue rationality offers a more diverse account of rationality without sacrificing the fundamental normativity of the concept. Furthermore, the narrower concept of reasonableness, promises to provide a ground for distinguishing among better and worse epistemic perspectives, which is a task critical to the success of the feminist project.

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Deborah Heikes
University of Alabama, Huntsville

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