Limiting Skepticism

Logos and Episteme 2 (2):211–224 (2011)
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Abstract

Skeptics argue that the acquisition of knowledge is impossible given the standing possibility of error. We present the limiting convergence strategy for responding to skepticism and discuss the relationship between conceivable error and an agent’s knowledge in the limit. We argue that the skeptic must demonstrate that agents are operating with a bad method or are in an epistemically cursed world. Such demonstration involves a significant step beyond conceivability and commits the skeptic to potentially convergent inquiry.

Author Profiles

Vincent Hendricks
University of Copenhagen
John Symons
University of Kansas

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