Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):43-73 (2019)
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Abstract

Arguments from evil purport to show that some fact about evil makes it (at least) probable that God does not exist. Skeptical theism is held to undermine many versions of the argument from evil: it is thought to undermine a crucial inference that such arguments often rely on. Skeptical objections to skeptical theism claim that it (skeptical theism) entails an excessive amount of skepticism, and therefore should be rejected. In this article, I show that skeptical objections to skeptical theism have a very limited scope: only those who reject certain (apparently) popular epistemological theories will be threatened by them.

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Perry Hendricks
Purdue University

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