On Truth-Functionality

Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):628-632 (2010)
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Abstract
Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is immune from the counterexamples that Schnieder proposes and is preferable to Schnieder’s alternative.
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First archival date: 2016-10-14
Latest version: 2 (2016-12-19)
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On Conditionals.Edgington, Dorothy
Methods of Logic.Quine, W. V.
Truth-Functionality.Schnieder, Benjamin

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2011-06-16

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