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Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons
Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):97-111 (2021)
Abstract
I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2020-02-11
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218 (#10,970)
2020-02-11
Downloads
1,120 (#10,417)
6 months
218 (#10,970)
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