Reply to Crupi et al.’s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for E and no logically stronger proposition, and that the agent updates her subjective probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization. For this specific scenario the authors propose to take the difference between Pr0 and Pri as the degree to which E confirms H for the agent at time ti , C0,i. This proposal is claimed to be adequate, because.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-07-09
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
189 ( #26,904 of 56,904 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #36,410 of 56,904 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.