Reply to Crupi et al.’s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213-215 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for E and no logically stronger proposition, and that the agent updates her subjective probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization. For this specific scenario the authors propose to take the difference between Pr0 and Pri as the degree to which E confirms H for the agent at time ti , C0,i. This proposal is claimed to be adequate, because.

Author's Profile

Franz Huber
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
304 (#49,350)

6 months
52 (#70,099)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?