I Can't Relax! You're Driving me Quasi!

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Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent moral properties. Quasi -Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi -Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond to this threat, showing that there is in fact space to develop and defend a robust moral ontology.
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Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
Ruling Passions.Blackburn, Simon
Ethics and Language.Parker, DeWitt H. & Stevenson, Charles L.

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