Are Knowledge Ascriptions Sensitive to Social Context?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Plausibly, the stakes in a practical task at hand can affect how generously or stringently people ascribe knowledge. I propose a new psychological account of the effect. My hypothesis is motivated by empirical research on how people’s judgements are sensitive to their social context. Specifically, people’s evaluations are sensitive to their ‘psychological distance’ from the scenarios they are considering. When using ‘fixed-evidence probes’, experimental philosophy has found that what’s at stake for a fictional character in a fictional scenario has little or no effect on how participants ascribe knowledge to them. My hypothesis predicts this finding. (This illustrates a widespread problem with X-phi vignette studies: if people might judge differently in other social contexts, we can’t generalize from the results of these experiments.) The hypothesis also predicts that people do not ascribe knowledge in a way deemed correct by any of the standard philosophical views, namely classical invariantism, interest-relative invariantism, and contextualism. Our knowledge ascriptions shift around in the way that’s most useful for social beings like us, and this pattern in our judgements can only be endorsed by a genuinely relativist metaphysics for knowledge.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JACAKA-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-04-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-04-30

Total views
58 ( #41,066 of 51,431 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #9,112 of 51,431 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.