El conocimiento de la propia mente: Donald Davidson sobre autoridad de la primera persona, externalismo y racionalidad

Dissertation, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas (2012)
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In this thesis, I elaborate and defend Donald Davidson's account of knowing one's own mental states that exhibit first-person authority. To that end, I place Davidson's account among others in the philosophical landscape concerning self-knowledge. Next, I examine his response to philosophical challenges that arise from mental content externalism and self-deception. Finally, I draw some insights froms Davidson's account to the broader aims of epsitemology.

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Marc Jiménez Rolland
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (PhD)


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