Conceptual Disagreement about Justice: Verbal, but Not Merely Verbal

Dialogue 58 (4):701-9 (2019)
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In this paper, I introduce the articles contained in this special issue, and I briefly explain some of the main arguments presented in my book 'A Conceptual Investigation of Justice'. A central claim in my book is that a verbal and yet also philosophically substantial disagreement over the word ‘justice’ lies at the heart of a number of issues in contemporary political philosophy. Over the course of introducing my book’s arguments and the commentaries in this issue, I also offer an account of what it means for a dispute to be verbal, but not merely verbal.
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First archival date: 2019-05-03
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