How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness

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Abstract
Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal experiences. I argue that this argument fails, by showing that its defenders cannot maintain that its crucial premise (properly understood) has the kind support needed for the argument to work, without begging the question against illusionism.
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Archival date: 2021-02-09
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