Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games

Economics and Philosophy (1):1-30 (2015)
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Abstract
The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interacting players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team – a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but a few formal representations have been discussed. In this paper we suggest a possible representation of these goals based on the notion of mutual advantage.We propose a method for measuring extents of individual and mutual advantage to the interacting decision-makers, and define team interests as the attainment of outcomes associated with maximum mutual advantage in the games they play.
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Archival date: 2017-10-21
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References found in this work BETA
Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
Team Preferences.Sugden, Robert
Team Reasoning: Theory and Evidence.Karpus, Jurgis & Gold, Natalie

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2015-09-07

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