Modal Cognitivism and Modal Expressivism

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Abstract
This paper aims to provide a mathematically tractable background against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I argue that epistemic modal algebras comprise a materially adequate fragment of the language of thought, and endeavor to show how such algebras provide the resources necessary to resolve Russell's paradox of propositions. I demonstrate, then, how modal expressivism can be regimented by modal coalgebraic automata, to which the above epistemic modal algebras are dually isomorphic. I examine, in particular, the virtues unique to the modal expressivist approach here proffered in the setting of the foundations of mathematics, by contrast to competing approaches based upon both the inferentialist approach to concept-individuation and the codification of speech acts via intensional semantics.
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Archival date: 2017-06-14
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References found in this work BETA
Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Mind and World.Price, Huw & McDowell, John
The Language of Thought.Churchland, Patricia Smith
Index.Yablo, Stephen

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