효율성의 관점에서 본 비엔나협약 상 구제수단의 문제

인권과 정의 422:28-45 (2011)
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Abstract

The paper aims to briefly look into the civil law remedies of CISG from the perspective of economic efficiency. It mainly illustrates the basic tools of remedies in CISG, and discusses its strengths and flaws from the standpoint of economic deals normally present in most of commercial transactions. As many literature have long contributed to the legal economic discourse, our discussion, as a matter of course, largely depends on the current stronghold, or prospect that those theories espouse. Generally, the remedies in CISG have two basic pathways addressing or penalizing the breach of contract from one party, namely specific performance and damages award. Other instruments to deal with the breach of contract cover a cure of defect, repudiation to perform a contract, additional period to perform a contractual duty, avoidance of contract and etc. This group of instruments can be classed as a privately administered remedies for our purpose of analysis. On this assumption, we can find many aspects of strengths in economic terms, but some paucity that the prescribed approach cannot properly address the best of economics between the contracting parties. This paucity comes mainly because the lawmakers normally could not pre-consider all circumstances among the individual contracting parties. For this reason, this paper argues in favor of privately administered remedies to fill the paucity of two typical remedies. Moreover, the contractual negotiation or design of contract is considered very important as the contracting parties are most informed about their best of economics besides the official lawmakers. The paper concludes with a short discussion of the electronic commerce in comparison with the traditional domestic and international commerce.

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