Abstract

McTaggart (1927), Le Poidevin (1988, 2007), and Currie (1992) argue that fictional events can only be discussed in tenseless terms because they aren’t actual, and because we lack an internal perspective of the fictional world. In this paper, I argue this is true only of some fictions, and that fictional events, in principle, can be tensed. The reality assumption, intentionalism, and make-believe provide mechanisms for generating tensed fictional truths, and fictions beyond paradigmatic examples, such as interactive fictions, provide access the fictional timelines, thereby allowing us to attribute A-properties to fictional events. I argue that our linguistic practice and phenomenology support taking the possibility of a fictional A-series seriously. I also show that attempts to explain away fictional tense are unsuccessful given constitutive differences between reality and fiction. Acknowledging the possibility of a fictional A-series provides significant upshots for the nature of fiction, time, and the aesthetics of tense.