The Task of the Critique of Judgment

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):243-269 (2001)
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Abstract

Kant says that the Critique of Judgment offers a “transcendental deduction” for the principle of the purposiveness of nature, or PPN. This is the proposition that empirical laws must be viewed as “having been given by an understanding (even though not ours)” so that they can be unified in a system. I argue that if we take the PPN to concern the application to appearances of ideas of pure reason, we can understand why its transcendental deduction is so important to Kant’s philosophical project, and why he is correct in thinking that it does not mark a retraction of his central philosophical views.

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Ted Kinnaman
George Mason University

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