Making metaethics work for AI: realism and anti-realism

In Mark Coeckelbergh, M. Loh, J. Funk, M. Seibt & J. Nørskov (eds.), Envisioning Robots in Society – Power, Politics, and Public Space. Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press. pp. 311-318 (2018)
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Engineering an artificial intelligence to play an advisory role in morally charged decision making will inevitably introduce meta-ethical positions into the design. Some of these positions, by informing the design and operation of the AI, will introduce risks. This paper offers an analysis of these potential risks along the realism/anti-realism dimension in metaethics and reveals that realism poses greater risks, but, on the other hand, anti-realism undermines the motivation for engineering a moral AI in the first place.
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First archival date: 2018-11-20
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