Deep Disagreements on Values, Justice, and Moral Issues: Towards an Ethics of Disagreement

TRAMES 24 (3):315–338 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Scholars have long recognized the existence of myriad widespread deep disagreements on values, justice, morality, and ethics. In order to come to terms with such deep disagreements, resistant to rational solution, this article asserts the need for developing an ethics of disagreement. The reality that theoretical disagreements often turn into practical conflicts is a major justification for why such an ethics is necessary. This paper outlines an ethics of deep disagreement that is primarily conceived of as a form of virtue ethics. Such an ethics asks opposing parties in moral and intellectual conflicts to acknowledge that (a) deep disagreements exist, (b) opposing positions should be recognized as worthy of respect, and that (c) one should seek dialogue and mutual understanding. This ethical approach conceives of toleration as a moral and political virtue and presents an argument for toleration based on deep disagreements.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-09-05
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
262 ( #25,204 of 64,138 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
82 ( #7,921 of 64,138 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.