Cognitivism about emotion and the alleged hyperopacity of emotional content

Philosophical Studies 173 (2):315-320 (2016)
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Abstract

According to cognitivism about emotion, emotions are reducible to some non-emotional states. In one version, they are reducible entirely to cognitive states, such as beliefs or judgments; in another, they are reducible to combinations of cognitive and conative states, such as desire or intention. Cognitivism is plausibly regarded as the orthodoxy in the philosophy of emotion since the 1980s. In a recent paper, however, Montague develops a powerful argument against cognitivism. Here I argue that the argument nonetheless fails

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

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