Perception and Imagination

In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Bravo Morando (eds.), Prereflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 245-276 (2015)
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According to a traditional view, there is no categorical difference between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of imagination; the only difference is in degree (of intensity, resolution, etc.) and/or in accompanying beliefs. There is no categorical difference between what it is like to perceive a dog and what it is like to imagine a dog; the former is simply more vivid and/or is accompanied by the belief that a dog is really there. A sustained argument against this traditional view is prosecuted by Sartre, who develops an alternative according to which there is a categorical difference between the two phenomenologies. This paper draws on Sartre’s work in this area to develop a similar account of perception and imagination as categorically different.
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The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
The Phenomenology of Memory.Fabrice Teroni - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 21-33.

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