The Character of Cognitive Phenomenology

In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. New York: Routledge. pp. 25-43 (2015)
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Recent discussions of phenomenal consciousness have taken increased interest in the existence and scope of non-sensory types of phenomenology, notably so-called cognitive phenomenology. These discussions have been largely restricted, however, to the question of the existence of such a phenomenology. Little attention has been given to the character of cognitive phenomenology: what in fact is it like to engage in conscious cognitive activity? This paper offers an approach to this question. Focusing on the prototypical cognitive activity of making a judgment that p, it proposes a characterization in terms of a Ramsey sentence comprised of twenty-three phenomenological platitudes about what it is like to make a judgment.

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University


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