Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solution

Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41 (2012)
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Abstract

The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.

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Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis

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