Counterfactuals, Counteractuals, and Free Choice

Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In a recent paper, Pruss (2013) proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for coun- terfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence argument can be formulated. This new transfer rule is immune to the counter-examples involving the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. However, we show that counter-examples to this new rule can also be generated, demanding that the Lewisian semantics be generalized for higher dimensions where counter-examples can always be generated.
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LAMCCA-2
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Archival date: 2020-02-10
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