Counterfactuals, counteractuals, and free choice

Philosophical Studies 178 (2):445-469 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In a recent paper, Pruss proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence argument can be formulated. This new transfer rule is immune to the counter-examples involving the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. However, we show that counter-examples to this new rule can also be generated, demanding that the Lewisian semantics be generalized for higher dimensions where counter-examples can always be generated.
Reprint years
2021
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LAMCCA-2
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-02-10
Latest version: 2 (2020-02-27)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-02-10

Total views
298 ( #21,640 of 2,448,668 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #11,345 of 2,448,668 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.